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In the context of popular demonstrations and political upheavals of the Arab Spring, 
this paper addresses the 2011 intervention in Libya as a case for deepening the 
understanding of individual-centred security policies. Drawing on a conceptual and 
normative approach of R2P and NATO, it seeks to denaturalize the idea that Operation 
Unified Protector is a success in organizational terms, in order to uncover the underlying 
implications of “efficiency” in running an intervention based on R2P. It argues that 
there is a dissonance between the normative evolution towards ethics and military 
deeds which blurs the significance of responsibility. This results in a twisted sense of 
cosmopolitanism which primarily affects the referent object of security that has been 
dominant in contemporary interventionism, i.e., the unsecured civilian.  
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Introduction 
 
I do not have illusions about NATO’s role in providing security in 
the region: NATO cannot solve all the problems and it never 
intended to do so. After all, Mediterranean partners never 
expected such a thing from NATO. But we can still provide a 
substantial added value in the region.[…] 
There is a new dynamic in the region. We must seize the 
opportunity to build on it. The foundations of regional 
cooperation have to be set today, in order to address the 
challenges of tomorrow.1 
 
On 9 February 2011, at the time of this speech, fifteen days were left before 
Resolution 1970 (2011) was adopted by the UNSC regarding the Libyan regime’s 
violence towards civilians. This excerpt of Anders Fogh Ramussen’s speech in Israel 
makes the self-projected role of NATO as a regional actor of security quite clear: it is 
not one of problem-solving, rather one of “substantial added value” service. Who 
knew then that NATO would soon have its first opportunity to demonstrate its 
“added value” in protecting civilians in the region?  
 
In the broader context of the political and popular upheavals spreading from Tunisia to 
Egypt during the early months of 2011, known as the Arab Spring protests, Libya’s 
crisis emerged in February 2011, when the forty year-old regime of Colonel Qadhafi 
was confronted to vigorous popular demonstrations and the formation of an armed 
opposition group, to which it launched a crackdown (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012). At a 
certain point, violence was to escalate as Qadhafi told the world that any Libyan taking 
arms against Libya would be executed. To the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Navi Pillay, the use of violence against demonstrators amounted to a crime against 
humanity, as other senior UN officials classified the situation as a problem of human 
protection and Qadhafi’s regime as an imminent threat (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 838-
839).  
 
As a response, the UNSC adopted resolutions 1970 on 26 February 2011, and 1973 on 
17 March 2011. First, Resolution 1970 (2011) set the political expression of grave 
international concern towards the situation of the Libyan people, as it recalled Libyan 
authorities’ responsibility to protect its population, and undertook several political 
                                                 
1 NATO SG Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivering a speech at the 11th Herzliya Conference in Herzliya, 
Israel, on 9 February 2011 (NATO, 2011a). 
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concrete measures such as an arms embargo and travel bans on the members of the 
regime, among others (RES 1970/2011). This only encountered the intransigence of 
Qadhafi’s regime, which rejected the demands, refused humanitarian aid convoys into 
Misrata and Ajdabiya, two of the most affected areas at the time (Bellamy & Williams, 
2011: 840).  
 
Therefore, Resolution 1973 (2011) was determinant in its ultimate decision to call for 
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing  
 
[M]ember States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and 
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all 
necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 
1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya […] (RES 
1973/2011).  
 
On 31 March 2011, NATO took the military command and control of Operation Unified 
Protector, specifically mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in relation with 
resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009 (2011), aiming at protecting civilians and civilian-
populated areas form attack or threat of attack in Libya (NATO, 2011f). As NATO’s 
most recent mission, its involvement may be framed in the continuity of a self-
proclaimed concern towards humanitarian causes and the protection of civilian lives, as 
demonstrated namely in Kosovo in 1999 (Falk, 2002; NATO, 1999; 2000a; 2000b) and 
Afghanistan in 2003 (NATO, 2004). 
 
Hence, Operation Unified Protector might be seen a priori as the affirmation of NATO’s 
post-Cold War trend towards humanitarian interventions, guided by ethical and moral 
objectives, with numerous references to the protection of “civilians” and the “Libyan 
people” (NATO, 2011c; 2011d; 2011f), provided with a specific mandate to that end. It 
seems that in the case of Libya NATO’s search for relevance went mostly by the 
geographical expansion of its partnerships with non-NATO members (Jordania, 
Morocco, UAE, Qatar) so as to increase its importance beyond its borders (Daalder & 
Stavridis, 2012: 6), along with the defence of values and principles, the affirmation of a 
code of conduct, oriented by decisions and choices seemingly ethical. With time, 
despite the critiques and scepticisms (Weisbord, 2010; Whitman, 2000), it appears that 
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NATO has managed to turn its out-of-area presence into general consensus and 
naturality.  
  
The existing literature on the intervention in Libya brings two main topics into debate, 
namely: 
1. NATO’s performance – depicted by enthusiasts as a remarkable success and 
victory of freedom; a model of functional efficiency regarding the low casualty 
rates and operational improvement comparatively to Kosovo, the rapidity of 
the response, the fulfilment of Resolution 1973’s primary objective, in saving 
civilians in Benghazi and Misratah, and destroying Qadhafi’s tank and artillery; as 
the right way to run an intervention based on the R2P doctrine (Barry, 2011; 
Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; NATO, 2011e; Western & Goldstein, 2011: 56-57). 
The organizational aspect is also enhanced by the fact that it energized the 
European side of NATO as it showed its assertiveness and division of labour 
with the USA (Valasek, 2011). 
 
2. Assessing the actual state and the future of R2P as the leading principle of 
humanitarian interventions in terms of:  
a. Its improvement. Some authors frame Libya within a “getting better all 
the time” argument, in that it represents a consecration of a successful 
humanitarian intervention, which has been gradually improved over the 
last twenty years, and stands in contrast with past failures in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Bosnia (Western & Goldstein, 2011).  
b. Its evolving dynamic, around the increasing role of regional actors in 
reinforcing consensus and legitimacy of decision-making (Piiparinen, 
2012).  
c. Its decisiveness to the future of protection politics, as it brings back the 
UNSC’s authority, thus introducing a “new politics of protection” in the 
decision-making that produced Resolution 1973, which is marked by 
coerciveness since the host state did not consent, for the first time in 
the UN record (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Welsh, 2011) 
d. Its disruption of the clarity of the liberal model of security and 
intervention, representing a paradigmatic change in how humanitarian 
discourses and war operated (Chandler, 2013: 130-131).  
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This paper is no exception in that it intends to reflect on the later topic with the 
support of the first, i.e., it focuses on NATO’s performance in Libya, analysing its 
discourses and evolving narrative as an organization, in order to reflect on R2P, what it 
currently entails, represents and implies. The particular features of the intervention 
will be analysed, in order to find to which extent we might still think of it within the 
R2P framework as it has been known so far. It is worth looking into the state of 
responsibility, not embodied in the R2P doctrine, but into what the deeds tell us about 
what it means to be responsible for other human lives. Ultimately, what does Operation 
Unified Protector in Libya tell about the current state of R2P as a doctrine for 
interventionism and about present days’ NATO as well?  
 
Our argument is that there is a paradox between political words and military deeds 
which blurs the significance of responsibility. In fact, there is a dissonance between the 
conceptual and normative dimension on the one hand, which is characterized by an 
approach of closeness regarding civilian needs, what enthusiasts see as a comeback of 
1990’s humanitarianism (Evans, 2011; Sewer, 2011; Robertson, 2011 cit. in Chandler, 
2013: 130). On the other hand, on the practical side of it, there is a distancing move 
away from the Libyan people in the management of the operation, marked by the use 
drones and a post-regime disengagement.  
 
In the end, the consequences of that conceptual and praxeological confusion – 
intended or unintended – might be negative for the same referent object the 
intervention was initially supposed to relieve, i.e., the innocent and unsecured civilian. 
This means responsibility is currently being practised as a label for political approval, 
and its content is not properly directed at the continuum of civilian protection. The 
security of those individuals remains entangled within a twisted cosmopolitanism.  
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I. Reinforcing the idea of responsibility through a growing 
sense of cosmopolitanism  
 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya has been commonly seen as the consecration of an 
evolving politics of protection developing since the end of the Cold War, and as the 
consecration of international consensus around it, since the UN resolution concerning 
Libya passed without a single dissenting vote (Western & Goldstein, 2011: 55). As 
such, this first section highlights how the idea of responsibility came to evolve and 
establish itself to ultimately influence security policies. The underlying idea of evolution 
and improvement behind the military intervention in Libya is approached under three 
perspectives, namely: its normative and conceptual background; its regional 
framework; and its functional agency. 
 
Drawing on a resumed analysis of the conceptual and normative evolution since the 
end of the Cold War, this section first sets the normative and conceptual background 
which allows understanding the intervention in Libya in a more contextualized manner. 
It will be seen, namely, that there has been a growing cosmopolitan concern towards 
civilian needs, which denotes a humanizing and individualizing approach of security by 
the interveners. Second, the regional framework of the intervention demonstrates 
how the making of an expanded consensus serves to reinforce the legitimacy and 
neutrality of the decision-maker, which ultimately ends up transmitting – third part of 
the section – the inherent efficiency of the functional agent in command and control of 
the military operation. Taken together, these three dimensions help reflecting on the 
enthusiasm regarding the operation as a success and regarding the adoption of R2P as 
a ground-breaking step in the moral evolution of interventionism.  
 
A/ Background: affirming “security as ethics” and the 
individualisation of security 
 
In the broader context of post-Cold War humanitarianism arising in the 1990’s, 
international security policies have shifted from state-centred approaches to an 
“individualisation of security”, i.e., a move focusing on individuals as primary referents 
of security policies. This individualisation of security is a post-Cold War trend of 
international security depicting the new visibility of a referent object of security other 
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than the state, namely the individual or the civilian. Thus in 1994 the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) report on human development introduced for the first 
time in the United Nations (UN) system the notion of “human security” (UNDP, 
1994). A decade later, through its High Representative Javier Solana, the European 
Union (EU) requested a special working group a report on a human security doctrine 
for Europe (Kaldor et al., 2004). Since then, “humanitarianism”, “ethical foreign policy”, 
“human development” and “human security” have been at the top of international 
security agendas and policies. The semantic and normative load associated to these 
notions demonstrates an unprecedented ethical move in International Relations.2 
 
In fact, from the 1990’s on, there is an evolution approaching Ken Booth’s idea that the 
state is not the end of security per se, but rather just a means to attain it (Booth, 2007: 
228). State becomes limited to being an agent of security, not a subject. Seemingly, as 
the moral consciousness of the individual value is not captured in the bipolar logic of 
physical survival and ideological divide anymore, it might have led, after the Cold War, 
to the pressure over states in undertaking military interventions to protect citizens 
other than their own from humanitarian disasters (Finnemore, 1996: 
153).Consequently, what was to be protected from then on were the human values 
(Booth, 2007), personified by individuals.  
 
In fact, the scale, the scope and the meaning of humanitarian action significantly 
expanded during the 1990 decade, with an increasing political and financial intromission 
of some states into the work of humanitarian actors. Michael Barnett (2005) considers 
this to be a politicization of humanitarianism and of the civilian object, which may be 
explained by geopolitical, social, economic and also normative factors of a multipolar 
world, in opposition with an initially a-politic humanitarianism (Chandler, 2002).  
 
Regardless of the politicization, we are to assume that the normative environment of 
this evolution is prevailing over other factors, for norms are actually the primary game-
changer of international politics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). As such, the underlying 
zeitgeist transpires an intensified cosmopolitan thinking. For a more precise insight of 
                                                 
2 Those expressions and concepts were indeed very well received and adopted in the codes of conduct 
of many international organizations, NGO’s, and foreign policies of states like Canada, Japan and 
Norway – concerning human security in particular – for they are rooted in moral values (Ramel, 2003; 
Suhrke, 1999), with an undeniable ability to generate important financial support for institutional 
multiplication, with the creation of new functional entities working for the “human” (Shusterman, 2006).  
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what cosmopolitanism implies, Anthony Kwame Appiah (2007) defines it as the 
equivalent of ethics in a globalized world, enclosing two ideas which often clash at each 
other. The first is that we, as human subjects, have obligations towards persons other 
than our family and acquaintances; the second is that we value particular human lives, 
in respect of their legitimate difference (Appiah, 2007: xiii). Cosmopolitanism then 
arises from a universal concern towards those who are at distance, whom we dot not 
necessarily know or resemble, but with whom we share the same essential and 
valuable nature.  
 
In political arenas, this new moral commitment towards the protection of individuals is 
embodied by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. R2P was endorsed as a 
doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005, unanimously adopted by UN member 
states thus agreeing with their responsibility to protect their populations from the four 
most inhumane crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. In case of manifest failure in doing so, international society would act 
through various provisions set out in the UN Charter (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 827; 
Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Piiparinen, 2012). 
 
Now, considering how norms and concepts had been evolving since the 1990’s, as 
exposed above, and how humanitarian interventions had already been taking place 
prior to this “indoctrination”3, R2P appears to be more of the same. With a minimal 
legal significance, since its normative content basically provided circumstances that had 
already been authorized for more than a decade, but rather a political and rhetorical 
one (Chesterman, 2011), the “illegal but legitimate” argument had become common 
ground.   
 
If we were to locate and define this type of normative evolution within Martha 
Finnemore e Kathryn Sikkink’s (1998) three-stage “norm life cycle” – 1. norm 
emergence; 2. norm cascade or acceptance; 3. internalization – as a model depicting 
the implantation and influence of a norm, we would say responsibility has been 
definitely internalized when R2P was formally adopted by international community, and 
it has been so as a norm of exceptionality in the sense it overcomes illegality for higher 
moral purposes such as protecting the life of individuals, supposedly. As such, R2P 
                                                 
3 See for example Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda or Somalia.  
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reinforced the idea and the narrative of a cosmopolitan responsibility of the states 
towards their own citizens and other states’. It also internalized the presupposition 
that in any future occasion in which the R2P principle would be invoked, the UN 
decision favouring it would be automatically legitimate, neutral, and ethical. The 
adoption of R2P as a “doctrine” protects in a way UN decisions from the critique of 
the eventual coerciveness against de facto states. This is why some authors find that 
Libya and Cote d’Ivoire constitute ground-breaking precedents of R2P, for they 
represent the first application of R2P in coercive campaigns against the consent of 
functioning states (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 828; Piiparinen, 2012: 388).  
 
Therefore, although legality is a vital criterion for international order, an ethical 
assessment based on a selfless cosmopolitanism seems to have taken the toll on it and 
to be sufficient to determine whether international action might be undertaken or not. 
Security has been constructed as ethics, appearing now as inherently legitimate and 
necessary, because it refers to organic living persons, and not to states defined by 
action-constraining laws.  
 
B/ Expanding consensus: regional embedding and co-responsibility 
 
Another feature of the intervention in Libya strongly contributing to the reinforcement 
of the idea of responsibility consists of its regional embedding. Although the role 
played by regional actors in the implementation of R2P is not new, and has been on the 
rise (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Piiparinen, 2012: 388), it is 
still of significant importance in the case of Libya, because of the actors involved and 
how they influenced the UNSC’s decision-making and by the same way reinforced its 
legitimacy by representing an expanded consensus.    
 
Very soon in the Libyan turmoil the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States 
(LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) took a side and joined the 
critiques towards the threatening position assumed by Qhaddafi’s regime at Libyan 
citizens. Specific actions were undertaken when, on 22 February 2011, the LAS 
suspended Libya’s participation until the cessation of violence. On 23 February, the 
AU’s Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué condemning the indiscriminate 
and excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 
839). 
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On 26 Februay 2011, when Resolution 1970 was adopted, it was explicit in  
 
Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African 
Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law that are being committed in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, […] (RES/SC/1970 2011).  
 
This acknowledgement is important for it implicitly recognizes the weight of the 
“condemnation” by those organizations in the UN deliberation regarding the measures 
referred in the resolution. It also strengthens the legitimacy of the decision, as it is 
sustained by an inherently intercultural and interregional consensus. Alex Bellamy and 
Paul Williams (2011: 841) find namely the LAS’ close inclusion and decision – 
traditionally opposed to humanitarian interventions – in calling for a no-fly zone and 
the establishment of safe areas to protect civilians absolutely decisive, and even 
consider that without it, the UNSC’s decision of using force in Libya would have been 
unlikely: 
 
Whatever the reasons behind the LAS decision, it changed the 
Council’s dynamics: it made opposition to enforcement more 
difficult; it brought the US on board, adding to the feasibility of the 
military option; it helped persuade the African Council members; 
and ultimately it pushed the remaining sceptical members towards 
abstention (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 846). 
 
As a matter of fact, the LAS is a clear example of how the idea of responsibility has 
been internalized and at the same time instrumentalized by international organizations. 
We find two different angles from which one may look at this relationship between the 
UNSC and the LAS. On the one hand, it is worth taking a small step back to look into 
the power effect present in the underlying conditionality of adopting R2P. Interestingly, 
through a Foucauldian reading of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) reports, Patricia Weber (2009) demonstrates that the 
Commission erected its doctrine in conformity with the way power is operated in the 
contemporary western society. Namely, the author stresses among other things, the 
method of control and supervision envisaged by the Commission in case the state fails 
at fulfilling its commitments towards development (Weber, 2009: 583). The 
Commission thus constructs a notion of sovereignty centered on the right of the 
population to life, establishing a biopolitical system over the duty to prevent, monitor, 
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control and regulate non western human lives. The sovereignty is substituted by the 
idea of responsibility, instituting biopower (Weber, 2009: 586-587).   
 
On the other hand, Touko Piiparinen (2012) makes a very interesting contribution 
through an extensive analysis of the increasing role played by regional and sub-regional 
organizations in implementing R2P, explaining norm compliance through geographical 
proximity, among other factors. This perspective is useful, for it demonstrates how 
eventual power effects of conditionality may be also internalized and instrumentalized 
by regional organizations in order to promote their strategic interests. The author 
namely argues that in the case of Libya, the LAS managed to wield a compliance pull on 
the permanent members of the UNSC by calling directly on their responsibilities 
towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and the protection of civilians, inducing 
them to authorise a timely and decisive action to protect civilians as required by the 
formal definition of R2P. Piiparinen sees the viewpoint of regional actors as having a 
decisive influence because of their geopolitical proximity to the conflict zone, 
functioning as an argumentative leverage in promoting their cause within the 
negotiations with international actors. He further illustrates his point resorting to the 
theory of “epistemic communities”, as forums of experts who can exert productive 
power in international politics, by disseminating new meanings, managing information 
on conflicts, outlining solutions, which ultimately affects the decisions of official actors 
on managing those conflicts. In the end, the LAS demonstrated its know-how by 
framing the Libyan crisis as a matter of protecting civilians, instead of “rebellion” or 
“civil war”, which would have confined the definition of the situation as an exclusive 
matter of Libyan internal affairs: “[o]ne in which Gaddafi’s central government was still 
entitled to the full legal rights of a state sovereign, including the Weberian monopoly of 
the use of force”. The carefulness towards certain specific words influenced the path 
to take by the UNSC (Piiparinen, 2012: 396-398).  
 
To sum up, the initial inherent power of conditionality in internalizing R2P from the 
outside was transformed into knowledge from the inside. It is interesting how the 
regional dynamic of the process proved that the idea of responsibility has been very 
well internalized, having been transformed into the main argument of regional actors’ 
rhetoric. As a result, diverse fields of action such as geopolitics, strategic interest, and 
power are all linked by one same unifying rhetoric of responsibility. Besides, the 
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regional consensus and involvement might have at the same time empowered UN’s 
decision and mandate, whilst establishing an extra care in the sense that its action 
would occur under the close attention of surrounding political actors in the region.  
 
Hence, the normative evolution and affirmation of the idea of responsibility as exposed 
in this first section showed that every success has its recipe. Highlighting its 
antecedents and underlying dynamics allowed understanding why the UN mandate 
aiming at human protection in Libya has been usually considered as a political success 
and consecration of the legitimacy of R2P.  
 
 
II. Do concerned security actors make military 
operations more efficient?   
 
The title of this section is a provocation, as it seeks to understand whether the idea of 
responsibility as approached so far is necessarily translated into efficiency when it 
comes to putting it in practice by functional organizations. To which extent does the 
success and construction of legitimacy in political resolutions necessarily imply a 
practical success? In fact, while the first section was about the causes and possible 
effects of the internalization of responsibility as a norm, this second section is about 
how the internalized norm has worked within the organization in charge of applying it 
to a practical case. In other words, it is about observing how NATO – in command 
and control of Operation Unified Protector – relates to responsibility.  
 
A/ NATO and the protection of individuals: an opportunity for 
reinforcement  
 
In the context of the evolution of responsibility, NATO has been central as a security 
actor putting in practice the normative guidelines associated to it. In its effort of 
institutional reinvention (Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011; Flockhart, 2012; Gärtner, 2003; 
Rasmussen, 2001; Sjursen, 2004; Zorgbibe, 2002), post-Cold War NATO has 
effectively evolved around the normative commitment towards the protection of 
civilians. Presently, that search goes mostly by defending principles and values, by 
affirming a code of conduct guided by seemingly ethical decisions and choices. This 
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reconfiguration of the Alliance around ethics and morality is probably the most 
decisive in the construction of its narrative as an organization, for it carries the 
concepts, discourses and ideas decisive to the change it strives to.4 
 
The decisive shift has namely occurred with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
(Falk, 2002; ICISS, 2001; Whitman, 2000), which introduced in the Alliance’s discourse 
the importance of individual security, human security and human rights (NATO, 1999; 
2000), as opposed to the predominant idea of security in the Cold War strategy. As it 
has generally been recognized that the Kosovo bombing campaign was illegal in the 
light of the UN Charter5, NATO members at the time preferred to justify their 
intervention is moral terms, referring the exceptionality of the situation and the fact 
that no precedent was intended to be created (Chesterman, 2011; Whitman, 2000). 
Thanks to that kind of argumentation, NATO was able to take the toll when it comes 
to action; as a matter of fact, although the Yugoslavian wars were particularly shocking, 
the UN deplored the abuses being committed without considering them due motives 
for military action. UN peacekeeping missions became more recurrent, but were 
aiming mostly at protecting civil operations – food transport, for example – instead of 
protecting civilians directly (Shaw, 2005: 18).  
 
Later in 2003, alongside the operational and geographical expansion for a more 
“global” NATO (Gärtner, 2003), the Alliance’s command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was also to protect the Afghan people from the 
terrorist threat under a peace enforcement mandate under chapter VII of the UN 
charter, originally supposed to support a UN force (Cornish, 2004; NATO, 2004; 
2012). Globally, NATO’s transformations after Cold War converge into the 
maximization and expansion of its fields of action – at the geographical and operational 
level. In fact, all these transformations arise from an incessant search for relevance, 
new tasks and new competences, as they are part of an evolving narrative which is 
imperative to the continuity of the Alliance, to a viable raison d’être (Flockhart: 2012: 
                                                 
4 According to Trine Flockhart (2012: 81), narratives describe the history, the purpose and the deeds of 
a collective entity such as NATO, thus contributing to its unity and facilitating its continuous 
transformation. The narrative plays also a decisive role in the permanent constitution of identity as well 
as in the management of knowledge, because it sets a perfect connection between the doing (action and 
practice) and the being (knowledge and identity) (Ciutâ, 2007: 192 apud Flockhart, 2012: 80). 
5 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against member states. There are 
only two exceptions to this: self-defense and action authorized by the UNSC. Neither applied to 
Kosovo (Chesterman, 2011).  
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79; Sjursen, 2004). Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2001) has rightly described NATO’s 
evolution as the affirmation of a constructivist policy through which the Alliance has 
imagined itself as an agent of change in the post-Cold War world.  
 
Now, regarding Libya, NATO could not have been clearer since the beginning about 
the nature of its commitment. NATO’s operational action would last until the 
following objectives would be achieved: the ending of all attacks and threats against 
civilians and civilian-populated areas; the withdrawal of all military forces by the regime; 
the permission by the regime of full and immediate humanitarian access to all people in 
Libya (NATO, 2011c). Frequently reaffirming the will of a speedy solution to the crisis, 
so Libyan people can live free of violence and thus determine their own future 
(NATO, 2011d; 2011e).  
 
Besides, as the Libyan people were explicitly asking for the removal of the Qadhafi 
regime, NATO had an extra responsibility towards a local emancipatory project, a 
specific role as practical and technical enabler of more than local opposition (Daalder 
& Stavridis, 2012), but of a revolutionary experience. Arendtian notions related to the 
revolution, such as the importance of “experiencing” and “freedom” of a new 
beginning, appear really pertinent here:  
 
Crucial, then, to any understanding of revolutions in the modern 
age is that the idea of freedom and experience of a new beginning 
should coincide. And since the current notion of the Free World 
is that freedom […] is the highest criterion for judging the 
constitutions of political bodies, it is not only our understanding 
of revolution but our conception of freedom, clearly 
revolutionary in origin, on which may hinge the extent to which 
we are prepared to accept or reject this coincidence (Arendt, 
2006: 19). 
 
Looking at NATO’s contribution, can a revolution be helped from the outside and 
supplied with the freedom element to protect the revolutionary people? From NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s standing point, it seems it can:  
 
I am very proud of what we have achieved together with our 
partners […]. Our military forces prevented a massacre and saved 
countless lives. We created the conditions for the people of Libya 
to determine their own future. Their courage and determination 
in the cause of freedom is an inspiration to the world. […] 
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This is a special moment in history, not only for the people of 
Libya and the wider region, but also for the NATO Alliance. It 
shows that freedom is the strongest force in the world” (NATO, 
2011e).  
 
So, it is clear in this statement how NATO represents its achievements in protecting 
the lives of citizens: as enabling the critical condition for the Libyan people to be able 
to have their own revolution, by providing them the freedom to do so. Therefore, 
when it secures the space for Libyan democratic politics to happen, NATO is 
strengthening its narrative as a normative power.6  
 
B/ Distancing methods reinforcing ethicality 
 
NATO’s involvement in Libya thus appears as an apotheosis of both its normative re-
orientation and out-of-area expansion, punctuated by chirurgical efficiency in its 
functional role at strictly accomplishing the UN mandate for civilian protection. This 
sub-section reflects on the operational aspects of NATO’s action in Libya, more 
precisely on how they contribute to the narrative depicted above.  
 
We are fulfilling our mandate. We have made significant and 
steady progress and saved countless lives as a result.  By 
maintaining a high operational tempo and carrying out precision 
strikes against legitimate military targets, we have seriously 
degraded the ability of the Qadhafi regime to attack civilians and 
relieved the pressure on civilian populated areas such as Misratah. 
Our operations are being conducted with the utmost care to 
avoid civilian casualties” (NATO, 2011d).  
 
This excerpt is striking for its discursive efficiency in making the best summary possible 
of a responsible operation. It describes a perfectly clean action, respectful of its political 
mandate, rapid in progress, efficient in saving lives that would otherwise have been 
lost, through precision strikes against legitimate military targets, remaining cautious and 
careful in avoiding civilian casualties – the so-called “unintended consequences”. When 
it presents itself as responsible, NATO internalizes at the same time the idea of 
functional efficiency.  
 
                                                 
6 Within international organizations, normative power may be understood as the exercise of an 
influence over the international scene that is inseparable of its cultural and moral content: “It is a power 
that empowers a certain set of values […], giving them validity, strength and influence, and giving those 
who adopt them access to a certain civilizational substance” (Burgess, 2011: 11-12). 
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It is interesting how this efficiency may be framed within Martin Shaw’s (2005) analysis 
of “risk-transfer wars”, as life-risk minimisers for the Western militaries. This kind of 
war is dominated by precision armament, control and command technology, 
informatization and robotization, and defines a set of fifteen rules characterizing the 
risk-transfer war. In the sole above quoted excerpt, three of these rules are explicitly 
contained, namely:  
 
1. “Wars must be strictly time-limited: these are quick fix wars”; 
2.  “Wars rely on ‘precision’ weaponry to sustain their legitimacy”;  
3. “Risks of ‘accidental’ civilian casualties must be minimized, but small massacres must 
be regarded as inevitable”.  
 
Now, other of Martin Shaw’s rules for “risk-transfer wars” (2005) may be added to 
that account, as the most evident regarding NATO’s performance in Libya:   
 
4. “Wars must, above all, minimize casualties to Western troops”: quantitatively, 
NATO’s record in Libya is effectively characterized by very low casualty rates. 
With an estimated civilian death toll of 5-10%, i.e., 25 rebel fighters and no 
casualty among NATO personnel (Barry, 2011: 7-8), one of the evident reasons 
why the Operation is portrayed as an unprecedented success.  
 
5. “Western forces should rely heavily on air power and look to others – as far as 
possible – to take risks on the ground”. One distinguishing aspect of modern 
warfare, and Operation Unified Protector is no exception to it, is the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and precision-guided bombs and missiles, as  
fighter aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuellers and 
attack helicopters constitute the gross of the military capabilities used in Libya  
(Barry, 2011; NATO, 2011f; Zehfuss, 2011). However, NATO has already a 
background concerning the “boots off the ground” strategy, namely its air 
campaign in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Besides, Libyan rebels made it clear that 
they did not want foreign boots on the ground, so as to mitigate the perceived 
threat to their sovereignty (Etzioni, 2012: 46-47).  
 
It is worth referring to Maja Zehfuss’ (2011) insight on how precision weaponry 
ultimately produces the idea of ethicality. Zehfuss (2011: 555) namely refers that 
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developments in weapon technology have been fortunate in making possible for war to 
reduce collateral damage, in the sense that the precision-guided munitions seem to 
enable to hit smaller targets. The relatively low number of civilian casualties in UAV 
operations conducts to the assertion that precision weapons have in some way 
improved the ethicality or humaneness of warfare. To Zehfuss (2011: 559), it is the 
focus on precision weapons that is crucial to the representation of Western warfare as 
ethical and superior.  
 
6. “Longer-term post-war risks must be spread as widely as possible through an 
international division of labour”: even before the termination of the Operation, 
post-conflict efforts were remitted in the hands of organizations such as the 
UN, EU, OIC, AU, LAS: “[w]e encourage these organizations’ efforts in the 
immediate and longer term post-conflict period” (NATO, 2011d). Later, asked 
about a continued military presence during the transition, starting 1 November 
2011, Rasmussen stated that NATO had “no intention to keep armed forces 
in…in the neighbourhood of Libya”. So once the operation was closed, it was 
definitely closed, in a “clear-cut termination” of the operation (NATO, 2011e).  
 
So as to underpin this idea, when questioned about further prosecution of pro-Qadhafi 
individuals in the post-regime phase, Rasmussen is also clear: the responsibility after 
31st October 2011 is the Libyan authorities’, which have to deal with the internal 
Libyan affairs (NATO, 2011e). This is a clear distancing move from a “we are 
responsible to protect citizens” to a “they” are responsible for the management of the 
consequences of our protective intervention. This post-operation disengagement 
testifies a distancing practical management in the sense of David Chandler’s (2013) 
argument of a “NATO is not responsible towards independent local actors” narrative. 
Consequently, clear-cut finales blur the original idea of responsibility, in that it gets 
diffused by a distancing representation of agency, sustained by the regional embedding 
of co-responsibility, on the one hand, and by the capable agency of liberated Libyans on 
the other hand. It tells in a way that ultimately there is no one to blame for the long-
term outcome of the intervention, but the local agency which may be successful or not 
in dealing with the post-becoming of their country.  
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To sum up, this section showed how the intervention in Libya was useful in 
strengthening NATO’s narrative concerning out-of-area interventions, by associating 
its functional action to an ethic of liberation and local emancipation. The technology 
inherent to the military capabilities used in Libya also served to reinforce the idea of 
ethicality as a military deontology respectful of innocent civilians. In fact, the western 
way of war, characterized by the transfer of risk into the distant enemies (Shaw, 2005) 
implies a distancing of the same human bodies the interveners claim to protect in their 
political discourses.  
 
 
Conclusion    
 
As one of the most recent patterns of interventionism, characterized by the protection 
of civilians, NATO’s intervention in Libya is an important case for deepening our 
comprehension of how individual-centred military interventions have come to evolve. 
This paper addressed namely the need to denaturalize the ideas of normalization and 
success inherent to the intervention in Libya, in order to better understand the 
substance and the implications of responsibility in adopting individual-centred security 
policies.   
 
The first section approached the conceptual and normative evolution underlying the 
affirmation of responsibility as a leading norm in contemporary interventionism. It 
showed there is actually a precise background anchored in the affirmation of security 
as ethics and focused on the individualisation of security policies, denoting a wider 
sense of cosmopolitanism arising since the end of the Cold War. Regarding the 
intervention in Libya, it also demonstrated how the increasing role of the regional 
embedding expanded political consensus, thus reinforcing the idea of co-responsibility 
and legitimacy behind the UNSC resolution to allow the use of force in Libya.  
 
The second section focused on NATO as the actor executing the military issuance of a 
“responsible mandate”. Although the Operation is consistent with the organizational 
evolution of NATO as being committed to morally justified missions aiming at 
protecting individuals, the opportunistic factor cannot be dismissed in the 
interpretation of its performance. In fact, the intervention in Libya proved to be an 
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important opportunity for the reinforcement of NATO’s out-of-area narrative and 
global representation as a normative power. The specific operational features of this 
intervention enabled a political distance as well as physical détachement, facilitating the 
clear-cut ending of NATO’s involvement and transferring different kinds of risks into 
the local setting, which ends up by confusing the original significance of responsibility. 
In spite of that, NATO managed to deepen its narrative, feed its continuous evolution, 
and maintain its self-identity. 
 
At last, like “human security” for example, it has been difficult to find consensus 
around a concept such as “responsibility”, namely concerning its formal definition, 
ontological implications, and practical applicability. “Responsibility” lacks objectivity, 
because it refers to values and as such it is hardly measurable through tangible 
indicators. Despite the ethical move at protecting persons, one cannot actually dismiss 
the manifest opportunity for reinvention and reinforcement it presents to international 
organizations such as the UN and NATO. Finally, this sort of amorality (Durodié, 
2010; Weber, 2010) is pointing at the apparent humanization of the leading patterns in 
international security as a paradox, which may be misleading in making an accurate 
balance of the “Springs” of the world.   
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